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Abstract
The Canadian federal government’s carbon pricing legislation has generated substantial
public and academic debate. In this paper we argue that academic debate should adhere to
standards for responsible conduct of research during crises such as the current climate
emergency, and avoid the nastiness and distortion that infect populist political rhetoric and
social media. We discuss the norms of responsible scholarship that apply to Canadian legal
academics, with a focus on standards that demand scrupulous fairness to other scholars
and to the materials one is analyzing. We argue that a recent article by Professor Dwight
Newman on the Saskatchewan and Ontario reference cases upholding the constitutionality
of the federal carbon pricing law does not live up to these standards in two ways. First, it
treats other scholars unfairly by distorting their scholarly work and lumping them into
derogatory, unsubstantiated general types. Second, it is unfair to the legal materials under
consideration by portraying the relevant case law in an unduly selective manner to
advance the author’s argument. We close the paper with some reflections on why this
particular case matters.
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Introduction
Professor Dwight Newman recently published an article on the constitutionality of the
federal government’s national carbon pricing legislation and the Saskatchewan and Ontario
court decisions upholding the law.4 The article was part of a rapidly growing academic
literature on Canadian governments’ powers to combat climate change. The vast majority
of this literature respects the norms of rigorous and fair inquiry that enable constructive
scholarly debate. It is important for legal scholars to uphold these norms, especially in
times of crisis such as the current climate emergency. Unfortunately, the article in question
did not, and the consequences for Supreme Court’s resolution of the carbon pricing
reference cases could be significant.
In this short article we start by emphasizing the importance of responsible
scholarship during times of crisis (Part 1). We then discuss norms for responsible conduct
of scholarly inquiry applicable to Canadian legal academics (Part 2), with a focus on
standards that demand scrupulous fairness to other scholars and to the materials one is
analyzing. In Part 3 we argue that the article by Professor Newman does not live up to
these standards in two ways. First, it is unfair to other scholars by distorting their scholarly
work and lumping them into derogatory, unsubstantiated general types. Second, it is unfair
to the relevant legal materials by portraying the relevant case law in an unduly selective
manner to advance the author’s argument. We close the article with some reflections on
why this particular case matters.

1. The importance of responsible scholarship during a crisis
The Canadian federal government’s enactment in 2018 of legislation to put a national price
on carbon emissions5 unleashed a storm of controversy. Three provinces challenged the
law in court. Two Courts of Appeal—in Saskatchewan and Ontario—upheld the legislation
as intra vires the federal government,6 while that of Alberta declared it unconstitutional.7
The Supreme Court of Canada was scheduled to hear appeals from the Saskatchewan and

Dwight Newman, “Federalism, Subsidiarity, and Carbon Taxes” (2019) 82 Sask L Rev 187.
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12 [GGPPA].
6 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40 [Saskatchewan Carbon Pricing Reference];
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 [Ontario Carbon Pricing Reference].
7 Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74 [Alberta Carbon Pricing Reference].
4
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Ontario decisions in March, 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic intervened. Appeals from
all three decisions are now tentatively scheduled to be heard together in September, 2020.8
These legal developments are unfolding in the context of an unprecedented crisis.
Human activity, primarily in the form of burning fossil fuels, is disrupting the climate
system.9 Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide were last this high more than three
million years ago, at a time when sea levels and global average surface temperatures were
much higher than they are now.10 Climate change has already begun to damage ecosystems,
species, people and economies.11 The window of opportunity to avoid catastrophic climate
change is shrinking rapidly.12 There is a growing consensus amongst governments and
climate experts that humanity is facing a climate emergency.13 The climate emergency
intersects with other crises including biodiversity loss, poverty, human migration, and
racist and colonial violence, not to mention the current public health crisis of COVID-19.
Crises can devastate communities and disrupt individual lives,14 causing competing
worldviews, ideologies and interests to come into conflict.15 In some crises, entrenched
privileges, ingrained habits and received wisdom are upended; in others, they are
reinforced.16 Profits and livelihoods are jeopardized for some, enriched for others.17 Both

Saskatchewan (AG) v Canada (AG), SCC Docket No 38663; Ontario (AG) v Canada (AG), SCC Docket No 38781;
British Columbia (AG) v Alberta (AG), SCC Docket No 39116.
9 See, eg, World Meteorological Organization et al, United In Science: High-level Synthesis Report of Latest
Climate Science Information Convened by the Science Advisory Group of the UN Climate Action Summit 2019
(Geneva: WMO, 2019); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC, 2014).
10 AM Haywood et al, “Large-Scale Features of Pliocene Climate: Results From the Pliocene Model
Intercomparison Project” (2013) 9 Climate of the Past 191 at 192; KD Burke et al, “Pliocene and Eocene
Provide Best Analogs for Near-Future Climates” (2018) 115:52 Proc Nat Acad Sci 13288 at 13289.
11 See, eg, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge, 2014); FJ Warren and DS Lemmen, eds, Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspectives on
Impacts and Adaptation (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2014).
12 See, eg, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the
Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission
Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable
Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Geneva: IPCC, 2018); Jonathan Watts, “We Have 12 Years to
Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns UN,” The Guardian (8 October 2018), online:
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-must-not-exceed-15c-warnslandmark-un-report.
13 As of July 24, 2020, 1755 jurisdictions and local governments representing more than 820 million people
had declared a climate emergency. Anon, “Climate emergency declarations in 1,755 jurisdictions and local
governments cover 820 million citizens,” online: https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climateemergency-declarations-cover-15-million-citizens/.
14 Stefanie Haeffele and Virgil Henry Storr, “Introduction,” in Stefanie Haeffele and Virgil Henry Storr, eds,
Government Responses to Crisis (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020) 1 at 1.
15 See, eg, Christian Lahusen and Maria T Grasso, eds, Solidarity in Europe: Citizens’ Responses in Times of Crisis
(Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018).
16 See, eg, Dorothea Hilhorst, “Disaster, Conflict and Society: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response,” in Dorothea
Hilhorst, ed, Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response (London: Routledge,
2013) 1 at 5-7.
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those who benefit most from and those who are harmed most by the status quo sometimes
resort to extreme measures. Politics and public discourse can get nasty, with social media
amplifying extremism and misinformation.18
Academic researchers are not immune to these pressures. Nor should we be.
Scholars should and do contribute to public debate, influence public policy, support their
preferred movements and oppose others—in short, engage fully in political and civic life.
They have as much right as anyone to feel and act upon the emotions elicited in a crisis.19
But when they engage in scholarly research and writing, they should not relax the
standards of rigour and fairness that normally apply to these undertakings. They should
resist allowing the nastiness and distortion that have infected contemporary social media
and populist political rhetoric to infect scholarly discourse. Why? Because adherence to
these norms of rigour and fairness is a big part of what gives academic research its
authority and legitimacy in a crisis.20
Actors in government, civil society and business often appeal to academic expertise
to diagnose and resolve crises. They often rely on academic scholarship to inform crucial
decisions and rules, as we have seen with many governments’ COVID-19 response
measures21 and climate change policies.22
This willingness to rely on scholarly expertise is based in large part on scholars’
adherence to norms of responsible research conduct. Misplaced reliance on such adherence
can have real consequences. A leading text on research ethics observes that people rely on
research results “to form social policy and to address practical problems” and that
researchers therefore “must strive to earn the public’s support and trust.”23 The authors
continue:
If research results are erroneous or unreliable, then people may be killed or harmed,
the environment may be degraded, money and resources may be misused or
wasted, and misguided laws or policies may be enacted.24

See, eg, Tatiana Beliaeva et al, “Benefiting from Economic Crisis? Strategic Orientation Effects, Trade-Offs,
and Configurations with Resource Availability on SME Performance” (2020) 16:165 Int’l Entrepreneurial
Mgmt J 165.
18 See, eg, Thomas T Hills, “The Dark Side of Information Proliferation” (2019) 14:3 Perspectives Psych Sci 323.
19 On the importance of emotions in a crisis, see Hyo J Kim and Glen T Cameron, “Emotions Matter in Crisis:
The Role of Anger and Sadness in the Publics’ Response to Crisis News Framing and Corporate Crisis
Response” (2011) 38:6 Communication Research 826.
20 See, eg, David B Resnik, Scientific Research and the Public Trust (2011) 17 Sci & Engineering Ethics 399
(2011).
21 See, eg, John Dupré, “’Following the Science’ in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Nuffield Council on Bioethics Blog
(29 April 2020), online: https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/blog/following-the-science-in-the-covid-19pandemic.
22 See, eg, Paris Agreement, 12 Dec 2015, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 Annex; Edward A Morgan and
Gabriela Marques Di Giulio, “Science and Evidence-Based Climate Change Policy: Collaborative Approaches to
Improve the Science–Policy Interface,” in Silvia Serrao-Neumann et al, eds, Communicating Climate Change
Information for Decision-Making (Cham, Switzerland: Springer) 13.
23 Adil E Shamoo and David B Resnik, Responsible Conduct of Research, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford, 2009) at 6.
24 Ibid at 6-7. While these observations were directed at scientific research, we believe they apply to all
research that is used to form social policy and address practical problems.
17
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A contemporary example will illustrate. In the spring of 2020, the World Health
Organization and several countries halted trials of hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19
treatment after a study was published in a leading medical journal reporting an elevated
risk of heart disease and death. The journal retracted the article25 after doubts were raised
about the data and the authors were unable to vouch for its accuracy. The journal editor
called this “a shocking example of research misconduct in the middle of a global health
emergency.”26 This misplaced reliance on academic research delayed the search for a
COVID-19 treatment and could undermine public trust in science.27
This example illustrates the double downside of reliance on research that fails to
live up to norms for responsible scholarship. If the failure is exposed, public trust in
scholarship can be eroded; and if it is not exposed, people can make decisions based on bad
information.28

2. Norms of responsible scholarship
The core values of responsible scholarship are honesty, fairness, trust, accountability and
openness.29 Scholars have “duties of honest and thoughtful inquiry, rigorous analysis … and
adherence to the use of professional standards.”30 Canada’s three main research funding
agencies require researchers to “strive to follow the best research practices honestly,
accountably, openly and fairly in the search for and in the dissemination of knowledge” and
“follow the requirements of applicable institutional policies and professional or
disciplinary standards.”31 At a minimum, this includes scholarly and scientific rigour in

Mandeep R Mehra, Frank Ruschitzka Amit N Patel, “Retraction--Hydroxychloroquine or chloroquine with
or without a macrolide for treatment of COVID-19: a multinational registry analysis,” The Lancet (4 June
2020), online: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31324-6, retracting Mandeep R Mehra et al,
“Hydroxychloroquine or chloroquine with or without a macrolide for treatment of COVID-19: a multinational
registry analysis,” The Lancet (22 May 2020), online: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31180-6; see
also The Lancet Editors, “Expression of concern: Hydroxychloroquine or chloroquine with or without a
macrolide for treatment of COVID-19: a multinational registry analysis,” The Lancet (3 June 2020), online:
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31290-3. The authors also retracted an article in the New England
Journal of Medicine after similar expressions of concern: Mandeep R Mehra et al, “Retraction: Cardiovascular
Disease, Drug Therapy, and Mortality in Covid-19,” New England Journal of Medicine (4 June 2020), online:
https://doi.org/ 10.1056/NEJMc2021225.
26 Sarah Boseley and Melissa Davey, “COVID-19: Lancet retracts paper that halted hydroxychloroquine trials,”
The Guardian (4 June 2020), online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/04/covid-19-lancetretracts-paper-that-halted-hydroxychloroquine-trials.
27 Melissa Davey, “Retracted studies may have damaged public trust in science, top researchers fear,” The
Guardian (5 June 2020), online: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/jun/06/retracted-studiesmay-have-damaged-public-trust-in-science-top-researchers-fear.
28 Ibid, quoting Professor Sharon Lewin, director of a research organization that suspended
hydroxychloroquine trials in reliance on the retracted study.
29 Council of Canadian Academies, Honesty, Accountability and Trust: Fostering Research Integrity in Canada—
The Expert Panel on Research Integrity (Ottawa: Council of Canadian Academies, 2010) at 38.
30 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada &
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Agency Framework: Responsible Conduct of
Research (Ottawa: Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research, 2016), s 1.1 [Tri-Agency Framework].
31 Ibid, s 2.1.2.
25
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proposing, conducting and publishing research, and accurate referencing of sources,
theories, concepts, methodologies, data and findings.32
University-level policies flesh out these norms. The Responsible Conduct of
Research Policy of the University of Saskatchewan, where the author and publisher of the
article discussed here are based, provides that the “research, scholarly and artistic work of
members of the University of Saskatchewan must be held in the highest regard and be seen
as rigorous and scrupulously honest.”33 Members of the university are responsible for
“conducting their research, scholarly, and artistic work according to the highest standards
of research integrity,” “[e]xercising scholarly and scientific rigour and integrity in
recording, analyzing and interpreting data, and in reporting and publishing data and
findings.”34
Departures from these norms cover a spectrum, from minor to egregious. The
article we are considering here is not egregious, but it departs enough from applicable
norms to warrant a response.
Norms of responsible scholarship cover not just outright fabrication and
falsification, but also distortion of research materials or other scholars’ work that leads to
inaccurate findings or conclusions.35 Responsible research demands the “highest levels of
exactitude” when “analyzing, interpreting, reporting, publishing, and archiving research
data and findings.”36 Similarly, while slander and libel of other researchers represent
another extreme example of misconduct, belittlement and ad hominem attacks against
other researchers are also inconsistent with the principles that everyone “directly affected
or involved in research … should be treated fairly and with respect”37 and that “evaluation
of the work of others” should be done “in a manner that reflects the highest scholarly,
professional, and scientific standards of fairness.”38
These norms arguably apply to a heightened degree to legal scholars, who study and
are more often than not members of a self-regulating profession that has a mandate to
serve the public interest.39

3. A Case in Point
Professor Dwight Newman’s article “Federalism, Subsidiarity and Carbon Taxes”40 departs
from these norms of rigour and fairness in two ways: first, by distorting the published work
of scholars with whom he disagrees, and portraying them in derogatory terms (Part 3.A);
Ibid.
University of Saskatchewan, Responsible Conduct of Research Policy (effective July 1, 2013), s 2.0, online:
https://policies.usask.ca/documents/Responsible_Conduct_Research_Policy__Procedures.pdf [U of S RCR
Policy].
34 Ibid, s 4.1.
35 Ibid, s 5.0(b); Tri-Agency Framework, supra note 30, s 3.1.1.
36 Council of Canadian Academies, supra note 29 at 39.
37 Ibid at 40.
38 Ibid at 39. While this principle applies mainly to formal peer review processes, we believe fairness is also
expected when evaluating others’ work in the context of scholarly publications.
39 While we focus on ethical responsibilities of legal scholars, practising lawyers’ reliance on questionable
academic research might implicate their professional responsibilities to clients, courts and the public.
Consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. See, eg, Michael J Saks and Charles H Baron, eds,
The Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts (Cambridge, Mass: Abt Books, 1980).
40 Newman, supra note 4.

32
33
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and second, by selectively presenting the relevant case law to suit his purposes (Part 3.B).
These failures undermine the credibility of the article and have potential consequences for
the adjudication of the legality of the federal carbon pricing legislation. The article was
cited six times, all favourably, in the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision on the legislation.41
At the Supreme Court, the Attorneys General of Alberta and Quebec cite the article
favourably four times in their interveners’ facta in the Saskatchewan and Ontario appeals.
Given the article’s multiple citations by the Alberta Court of Appeal, it seems likely that it
will be cited by parties and interveners in the appeal from that decision as well.42
Whatever the Supreme Court decides in the carbon pricing appeals, it will likely
consider this article. Parties, interveners and the Court—not to mention legal scholars and
interested practitioners—should be aware of the article’s shortcomings before the
Supreme Court hears oral argument this fall.
Let us be clear: We take no issue here with the substance of Professor Newman’s
criticism of the Saskatchewan and Ontario GHG pricing reference decisions, nor with his
advocacy for the principle of subsidiarity in Canadian constitutional interpretation. We do
not intend to enter the substantive debate about carbon pricing or the federal division of
powers in this short article. Our concern instead is with how Professor Newman chose to
make his argument and the implications of this choice for legal scholarship and informed
public debate.
A. Fair treatment of other scholars and their work
Professor Newman’s article treats the scholars with whom he disagrees unfairly by
distorting their scholarly publications and using unsubstantiated generalizations to
discredit them. In particular, he distorts the work of environmental law scholars Nathalie
Chalifour and Jason MacLean. He accuses Professor Chalifour of wishing that the problem
of climate change would change the Constitution. He supports this characterization by
citing the title of one of her articles, “Making Federalism Work for Climate Change,” and
claiming that her “recent focus has simply been to explicitly urge judicial adaptation of the
Constitution to ensure the implementation of climate change policies.”43
This is a distortion of Professor Chalifour’s work. Newman fails to engage at all, let
alone in a rigorous or careful way, with the argument in “Making Federalism Work,” merely
mentioning its title as if it were proof of a wish to change the Constitution. In fact, in this
and her other articles impugned by Professor Newman, Professor Chalifour relies on
careful analysis of past constitutional decisions to argue that regulation of GHG emissions
falls within existing federal jurisdiction.44 To claim that she simply wishes to “change the
Constitution” is a serious distortion.
In the same passage, Professor Newman suggests that Professor Chalifour’s work is
incoherent insofar as it both criticizes carbon taxes from a feminist perspective and
Alberta Carbon Pricing Reference, supra note 7.
As of the date of writing the only factum filed in the Alberta appeal was that of the appellant Attorney
General of BC. That factum does not mention the article, but it is just the first of many to be filed in that case.
43 Newman, supra note 4 at 189 n 9 and accompanying text, citing Nathalie J Chalifour, “Making Federalism
Work for Climate Change: Canada’s Division of Powers over Carbon Taxes” (2008) 22:2 Nat J Con L 119.
44 See, eg, Chalifour, ibid; Nathalie J Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling over Climate Policy in the Canadian
Federation: Key Issues in the Provincial Constitutional Challenges to Parliament’s Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act” (2019) 50 Ottawa L Rev 197.
41

42
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defends the federal government’s constitutional power to enact one. Newman complains
that he has “not identified in her later work any explanation of why she now exempts the
Trudeau government’s carbon tax policies from her prior demands for gender analysis.”45
There is no contradiction here. It is perfectly coherent to criticize a law on its merits
while endorsing its constitutionality.46 Professor Chalifour endorses a federal carbon tax
even as she cautions that it must be designed carefully to avoid placing an unfair burden on
vulnerable groups.
In another passage, Professor Newman asserts that Professor Chalifour has
questioned the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction under the Peace, Order and Good
Government (POGG) clause “[f]or reasons that are not wholly discernible.”47 On the
contrary, a careful and fair reading of Professor Chalifour’s work would have revealed that
she explicates her reasoning fully in an article in which she argues that her interpretation is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent tendency to prefer overlapping rather than
exclusive jurisdiction.48 One may disagree with her interpretation, but it is misleading to
suggest that her reasoning is not wholly discernible. To imply that a scholar’s reasons are
obscure when they are not is to impugn unfairly the scholar’s intellectual rigour.
Newman’s treatment of the work of Professor Jason MacLean, his junior untenured
colleague at the University of Saskatchewan, is even more problematic. He begins by
claiming that Chalifour and MacLean have “a tendency to write in overly narrow ways as if
their central policy concerns … must be the central object of legal planning at the expense
of all other policy considerations, principles, and human values.”49 This characterization is
unfair and inaccurate. The only support Newman provides for it is a footnote that claims:
Thus, authors like MacLean develop arguments in which every institution is corrupt
and then the conclusion is that a party of academics must guide all Canadian policy
[…]. That the implication embodies strong-form elitism appears to generate no
concern for someone focused entirely on particular policy concerns over others.
MacLean, of course, thinks that his approaches are actually quite democratic, in so
far as he regards Canada as a “carbon democracy”—a sort of non-tropical form of
banana republic—and thinks that he offers a different democratic pathway […]. But
the readiness to condemn all Canadian institutions just manifests a similar refusal to
consider working from within the wisdom of long-established institutions and
principles.50
This is an unfair characterization of MacLean’s published work, which cannot reasonably
be interpreted as suggesting that every institution is corrupt or that Canadian
environmental law should be steered by a cabal of academics. MacLean argues that
45 Newman, supra note 4 at 189 n 9, citing Nathalie J Chalifour, “A Feminist Perspective on Carbon Taxes”
(2010) 21(2) Can J Women & L 169.
46 See, eg, Guy Régimbald and Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 2nd ed (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2017) at 188-90 (§§5.35-5.41).
47 Newman, supra note 4 at 196.
48 Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling,” supra note 44.
49 Newman, supra note 4 at 189.
50 Ibid at 189 n 12, citing Jason MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental Law:
Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 111; and Jason MacLean, “Paris and
Pipelines? Canada’s Climate Policy Puzzle” (2018) 32 J Envtl L & Prac 47.
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regulatory capture by industry is the root problem underlying Canadian environmental law
and policy.51 This proposition follows a long line of theoretical and empirical literature,52
and he supports it with evidence.53
In the second article impugned by Newman, Professor MacLean argues that
Canada’s inconsistent embrace of both the Paris climate change accord and continued fossil
fuel development can be explained by viewing Canada as a “carbon democracy.”54 This
argument is tailored to the conditions of advanced industrial democracies, grounded in
scholarly literature55 and supported by evidence.56 To characterize it as treating Canada as
a “non-tropical form of banana republic” is inaccurate and unfairly dismissive.
To portray MacLean as arguing that “a party of academics must guide all Canadian
policy” is also unfair and inaccurate. MacLean writes:
Scholars across relevant disciplines must … collaborate on and effectively
communicate concrete alternative pathways, political-economy trajectories away
from oil and gas development towards sustainability. … A particularly promising
approach is to identify and communicate the tangible co-benefits of addressing

MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem,” ibid; Jason MacLean, “Regulatory Capture and the Role of
Academics in Public Policymaking: Lessons from Canada’s Environmental Regulatory Review Process’ (2019)
52:2 UBC L Rev 479.
52 See, eg, George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2:1 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3; Michael E
Levine and Jennifer L Forrence, “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis” (1990) 6 JL Econ & Org 167; Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, “Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment” (1991) 16:3 L & Soc Inquiry 435; Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, “The Politics of
Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture” (1991) 106:4 QJ Econ 1089; David R Boyd,
Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 251-6;
Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review” (2006) 22:2 Oxford Rev Econ Pol’y 203; Daniel Carpenter and
David A Moss, eds, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (New York:
Cambridge, 2014). In the context of environmental regulation, see, eg, Sara Singleton, “Co-operation or
Capture? The Paradox of Co-Management and Community Participation in Natural Resource Management and
Environmental Policy-Making” (2000) 9:2 Envt’l Pol 1; David B Spence, “The Shadow of the Rational Polluter:
Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law” (2001) 89:4 Cal L Rev 917; Matthew D
Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits” (2002) 21
Stan Envt’l LJ 81; Mark Winfield, “An Unimaginative People: Instrument Choice in Canadian Law and Policy”
(2008) 71 Sask L Rev 79 at 85-86; Michelle C Pautz, “Next-Generation Environmental Policy and the
Implications for Environmental Inspectors: Are Fears of Regulatory Capture Warranted?” (2010) 12:3 Envt’l
Prac 247; Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner & Benjamin J Richardson, “Whatever Happened to Canadian
Environmental Law?” (2010) 37:4 Ecology LQ 981 at 988, 1013; David R Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier: A
Prescription for Stronger Canadian Environmental Laws and Policies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) at 202-07;
Bruce Campbell, “Preconditions, Regulatory Failure, and Corporate Negligence Behind the Lac-Megantic
Disaster” (2018) 48 RGD 95.
53 MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem,” supra note 50 at 121-4.
54 MacLean, “Paris and Pipelines,” supra note 50.
55 The concept of “carbon democracy” was developed by political theorist Timothy Mitchell to explain how
leading industrialized states’ dependence on oil shapes their political dynamics. Timothy Mitchell, ‘‘Carbon
Democracy” (2009) 38:3 Econ & Soc’y 399; Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of
Oil (New York: Verso, 2011).
51

56
In addition to marshalling his own evidence, MacLean cites Laurie Adkin’s work on the dynamics of “carbon
democracy” in a Canadian context: see, eg, Laurie Adkin, ed, First World Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and
Governance of Alberta (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2016).
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climate change—including economic development and enhanced community
resilience.57
Far from advancing an undemocratic position, Professor MacLean links engaged
scholarship with an agenda for democratic renewal:
Communicating the co-benefits of addressing climate change can encourage greater
public attention and action, and thereby influence government action ….
Importantly, … climate and sustainability policy actions that clearly embody cobenefits … are capable of attracting broad public support, which is the critical
ingredient of a countervailing democratic movement capable of displacing the
outsized influence of the oil and gas industry on policymaking in contemporary
carbon democracies like Canada.58
MacLean then argues that the “very same mechanisms that created and reproduced
Alberta’s ‘petro-politics’—i.e. lobbying and industry-government partnerships, media
campaigns, community engagement initiatives, and not least, academic research—may be
deployed to help create a political economy based on renewable energy and community
resilience.”59 “Accordingly,” he concludes, “sustainability advocates and scholars must do
more to show how a post-carbon democracy can work in practice.”60 MacLean’s argument
is consistent with widely accepted approaches to the mobilization of scholarly
knowledge.61 It is unfair to portray it as undemocratic and embodying “strong-form
elitism.62
Professor Newman also distorts statements made by Professors Chalifour and
MacLean in popular media. He claims, for example, that an article they wrote in Policy
Options refers to litigation challenging climate change policies as “bicker[ing] and navelgaz[ing].”63 On the contrary, their reference to “bicker[ing] and navel-gaz[ing]” was a
collective self-critique directed at all Canadians, not at litigants opposing a carbon tax, as
Newman implies.64
These numerous distortions of his opponents’ published work exhibit unfair
treatment of other scholars and their work, and a lack of scholarly care and rigour.
Professor Newman’s article also resorts to unsubstantiated generalizations to discredit his
interlocutors. The article disparages his perceived opponents as “these sorts of
environmental law academics,”65 “environmental advocates like Chalifour and MacLean,”66
MacLean, “Paris and Pipelines,” supra note 50 at 72.
Ibid at 73.
59 Ibid at 73-4.
60 Ibid at 74.
61 See, eg, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, “Guidelines for Effective Knowledge
Mobilization,” online: https://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/funding-financement/policiespolitiques/knowledge_mobilisation-mobilisation_des_connaissances-eng.aspx.
62 Newman, supra note 4 at 189 n 12.
63 Ibid at 187.
64 Nathalie Chalifour and Jason MacLean, “Courts Should Not Have to Decide Climate Change Policy,” Policy
Options (21 December 2018), online: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/december-2018/courts-notdecide-climate-change-policy/.
65 Newman, supra note 4 at 188.
66 Ibid at 189.
57

58
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“authors like MacLean,”67 and people who “are inclined to mock” Saskatchewan’s decision
to challenge the federal carbon price and who “neglect deep underlying values that have
shaped the Canadian Constitution and the life of human communities that the Constitution
has enabled.”68 These casual generalizations are examples of sloppy research, insofar as
Newman fails to identify anyone other than Chalifour and MacLean who allegedly falls into
these categories. They also compound the article’s unfair treatment of these scholars and
their work.
B. Fair treatment of the relevant case law
Professor Newman bolsters his attack on Professors Chalifour and MacLean with a
selective and self-serving portrayal of the case law at the centre of the dispute. He does this
in two ways: by exaggerating the degree of division amongst the judges in the
Saskatchewan and Ontario reference cases, and by presenting a blinkered view of the case
law on the POGG power.
First, he writes that the seven judges in the Ontario and Saskatchewan reference
cases who would uphold the federal legislation “are split among three different—and not
entirely consistent—explanations of the legal basis for federal jurisdiction, meaning there
is as strong a combined vote for the unconstitutionality of the legislation as for any single
explanation of its constitutionality.”69
There are two problems with this claim: it exaggerates the disagreement amongst
the judges and it compares apples and oranges. Professor Newman is correct that the
three-judge majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal characterized the pith and substance of
the legislation as “establishing minimum national standards to reduce GHG emissions,”
whereas the three-judge majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal characterized it as
“establishing minimum national standards of price stringency for GHG emissions” and the
concurring judge in Ontario characterized it as “establishing minimum national greenhouse
gas emissions pricing standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”70 Professor Newman
asserts that “there are differing levels of breadth” and “even explicit clashes” between these
three characterizations and promises to “return later in the article to consider these
distinctions further.”71
The article does later discuss several of the characterizations proffered by parties
and interveners, but nowhere does it directly compare the characterizations offered by
these seven judges. The “pith and substance” characterizations of the Saskatchewan threejudge majority and one Ontario concurring judge, in particular, amount to the same thing:
setting minimum national GHG price standards. Any distinction between “establishing
minimum national standards of price stringency for GHG emissions” and “establishing
minimum national greenhouse gas emissions pricing standards to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions” is fine if there is one at all. And while the difference between setting minimum
national GHG pricing standards and the Ontario majority’s “minimum national standards
for GHG emissions reductions” is real, these seven judges were not far apart on this point
Ibid at 189 n 12.
Ibid at 190.
69 Ibid at 188.
70 Ibid at 188 n 6.
71 Ibid.
67
68
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compared to the wide range of characterizations proffered by parties and interveners, and
they all agreed that the legislation was a valid exercise of the national concern branch of
the POGG power. If anything, Professor Newman acknowledges the similarity amongst
these opinions when he writes “the majority judges have ended up accepting
characterizations focused on the setting of a national minimum price” on carbon
emissions.72
Our point is not to pick apart the fine points of these cases or of Professor Newman’s
argument. Rather, it is that by asserting that these opinions present three different and
partly inconsistent explanations of the constitutionality of federal carbon pricing legislation
without actually comparing and contrasting those explanations, the article is not fair to the
judicial decisions under consideration.
The second problem with the claim that there is “as strong a combined vote for
unconstitutionality as for any single explanation of its constitutionality” is that it conflates
apples with oranges. Votes for unconstitutionality are votes for a particular conclusion.
Votes for explanations of constitutionality are votes for a particular path to a conclusion. A
conclusion and a path to a conclusion are different things. The multiplicity of judges on
appellate courts means that the number of paths is likely to exceed the number of
conclusions. The reverse is impossible if the conclusion in question is a binary choice, as it
is here (constitutional or unconstitutional). In such a case the number of conclusions can
equal but not exceed the number of explanations. Therefore, to compare the number of
votes for or against a law’s constitutionality with the number of votes for any particular
explanation of its constitutionality or unconstitutionality is not very informative and risks
giving a false impression of the strength of opposition to the federal carbon pricing
legislation in these two decisions.
Another way in which the article is not scrupulously fair to the legal materials is by
presenting a partial and blinkered account of the POGG case law. Professor Newman claims
that “the case law does not support the three-branch description of [the POGG power] often
cheerily offered by those who would centralize the federation.”73 He is right that the courts
have construed this branch narrowly and have rarely invoked it to uphold federal
legislation. He may even be right to suggest that the Supreme Court’s consideration of the
federal carbon price references will be “an occasion to sort out what branches actually exist
on the POGG power,” and that “there are real arguments for considering [the national
concern branch’s] legal status suspect.”74 But he supports the latter claim by painting a
selective picture of the national concern jurisprudence.
First, Professor Newman suggests that the national concern branch has only been
used to uphold federal legislation once, in Crown Zellerbach,75 and that the judges in that
case created it “out of whole cloth” merely because they “thought they needed it.”76 This
claim is not substantiated. First, Newman gives no reason for rejecting the two other
Supreme Court decisions that are commonly cited as upholding federal legislation under

Ibid at 198-99.
Newman, supra note 4 at 201.
74 Ibid at 196 n 47.
75 R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 SCR 401.
76 Newman, supra note 4 at 196 n 47 and accompanying text.
72
73
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the national concern branch,77 other than to allege that some unidentified scholars
consider them to fall under the “gap” branch.78
Second, his criterion for judging the doctrine’s existence is unduly demanding: the
number of cases in which federal legislation has been upheld by the Supreme Court solely
and explicitly on this basis. He does not acknowledge that the branch’s existence might also
be determined by the number of cases in which the Supreme Court and other courts have
classified matters as falling within the national concern branch even if they did not uphold
federal legislation on this basis;79 and cases in which courts have said the branch exists.80
These cases date back at least to 1946,81 and possibly much earlier. To claim that the
Supreme Court invented the branch “out of whole cloth” in Crown Zellerbach, and that “the
case law does not support the three-branch description of the POGG power,”82 unfairly
downplays this judicial history.
The existence of the three branches of the POGG power is accepted by Canadian
courts and commentators. Professor Newman’s own co-authored constitutional law
treatise makes no suggestion that the national concern branch does not exist, nor that it
was invented in 1988.83 As the late doyen of Canadian constitutional law, Peter Hogg,
wrote, “The national concern branch of p.o.g.g. has been recognized in many cases since
1946” and “The cumulative effect of these cases is to establish firmly the national concern
branch of p.o.g.g.”84
We have no problem with Professor Newman claiming that the national concern
branch does not exist; what we object to is his doing so without giving fair consideration to
the decades of case law and scholarly commentary that point in the opposite direction.

4. So what?
Professor Newman’s article is not an egregious case, but in our view it crosses a line that
separates distortion and disparagement from constructive scholarly debate. The problems
we have documented are serious enough to cast doubt on the article as a whole, not just the
portions we identify as problematic. These problems deserve to be aired so that parties and
courts do not misplace their reliance on the article in making decisions about the carbon
pricing reference cases.

Chalifour, “Making Federalism Work,” supra note 43 at 179, citing .Johannesson v West St Paul (Rural
Municipality), [1952] 1 SCR 292 (aeronautics); Munro v National Capital Commission, [1966] SCR 663
(National Capital Region).
78 Newman, supra note 4 at 196 n 47.
79 Eg Ontario Hydro v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 SCR 327; Pronto Uranium Mines Ltd v Ontario
(Labour Relations Board), [1956] OR 862, 5 DLR (2d) 342 (atomic energy).
80 Examples from the Supreme Court include Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, 1975, [1976] 2 SCR 373; Labatt
Breweries v Canada (AG), [1980] 1 SCR 914; Schneider v British Columbia, [1982] 2 SCR 112; RJR-MacDonald
Inc v Canada (AG), [1994] 1 SCR 311; RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199; R v Hydro-Quebec,
[1997] 3 SCR 213; R v Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 SCR 571.
81 Ontario (AG) v Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] AC 193, [1946] 2 DLR 1 (PC).
82 Newman, supra note 4 at 196 n 47 and 201.
83 Régimbald and Newman, supra note 46 at 232-38 (§§6.15-6.30).
84 Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2017 student ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 17.11
and 17.12 (§17.3(a)).
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A rigorous peer review process would normally catch most problems like the ones
we have identified with this article.85 Journal editors may feel pressure to dispense with or
rush review processes to maximize the relevance and exposure of articles addressing timesensitive issues like the carbon pricing references or the COVID-19 pandemic. The
retracted hyrdoxychloroquine article we mentioned earlier was published around a month
after submission, impeding thorough peer review. Journals should certainly strive to make
timely contributions to discourse on pressing public issues, but not at the expense of norms
of responsible scholarship.
Vigorous debate and disagreement are the lifeblood of academic discourse and the
engine for advancement of knowledge. To insist on rigour and fairness in such debate is not
to impose “political correctness” on scholars who espouse unpopular views. Nor is it a
manifestation of the fragility of a liberal academic establishment unable to handle
controversial perspectives. It is necessary to enable constructive scholarly debate and to
maintain public trust in academic expertise.
We have no doubt that constructive scholarly debate on climate change, carbon
pricing, division of powers, the national concern branch, subsidiarity, regulatory capture
and the role of academics in a democracy is possible. To be clear, our purpose in this article
is not to take a position in that debate. This article is intended neither as a critique of the
substance of Professor Newman’s position on those issues, nor as a defence of those of
Professors Chalifour and MacLean. If we defend their work here, it is only to the extent
necessary to substantiate our claim that Professor Newman’s article does not uphold
standards of scrupulous fairness in scholarly research. We offer this article as a reminder of
mutual expectations for responsible scholarship and look forward to the continuation of
vigorous, constructive and publicly beneficial scholarly debate on these important issues.

The Saskatchewan Law Review failed to reply to inquiries in December, 2019, June, 2020 and July, 2020,
whether Professor Newman’s article was peer reviewed.
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